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Summary 
Due to the ongoing crisis, several reforms have been implemented at the EU-level, which 
are tilted towards strengthening the budget discipline of EMU member states. These reforms 
underlie the view that government profligacy is the main culprit of the crisis. Consequently, a 
fiscal compact that includes national debt brakes at its core has been introduced in the EU. 
However, several economists emphasise that the EMU is an incomplete currency union. As a 
result, massive external imbalances have been built up in the pre-crisis years. Therefore, this 
present paper analyses whether a debt break, which is viewed as supportive for sustainable 
public finances, can also contribute to a convergent development in the EMU. The back-of-the-
envelope simulations run for a typical current-account surplus and -deficit country (Germany 
and Spain respectively) provide mixed results. It is shown that under a debt brake current-
account deficits can be lowered in a boom phase. This is because automatic stabilisers are 
allowed to work properly. Additionally, it is less probable that the working of automatic 
stabilisers is counteracted by pro-cyclical fiscal policy. But the impact of the debt brake on 
current-account balances depends on various factors, i.e. the position of an economy in the 
business cycle, the sign of the current-account balances and the instruments chosen to adjust 
the structural budget balance. Consequently, European policy-makers should be aware of the 
fact that the structural drawbacks of the EMU cannot be resolved by the attempt to balance 
structural government budgets. For this other measures than a fiscal compact such as a 
delegation of fiscal powers to the union level are necessary.  
 
JEL code: E62, F42, H60, C20 
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1 Introduction1 
This chapter examines if national debt brakes can prove effective in reducing current 
accounts imbalances in the European Monetary Union (EMU). In the wake of the Euro crisis, 
EU leaders have implemented several reform measures to strengthen budgetary discipline in 
the EU by tightening the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as part of the Euro-Plus-
Pact and introducing a new fiscal compact, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) (see EU-Memo/11/ 647, TSCG, 
2012). While the revised version of the SGP already encourages the implementation of national 
fiscal rules such as the German debt brake, Article 3(2) of the TSCG obliges, at least, EMU 
member countries to implement a balanced-budget rule in national law. These reforms are 
driven by the perception that government profligacy is the main culprit of the current crisis. 
However, since the launch of the Euro persistent current account imbalances have built up in 
the EMU (Colombier, 2011). From the theory of optimum currency areas one can infer that due 
to different national systems, e.g. labour market institutions, economic shocks such as the 
German Hartz-IV reforms have hit member countries of the EMU asymmetrically (De Grauwe, 
2009b). In particular, a powerful adjustment mechanism such as a sufficient flexible and mobile 
labour market, to mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks is absent in the EMU (Dullien and 
Schwarzer, 2009).2 Consequently, the EMU is viewed as an incomplete currency union (De 
Grauwe, 2009a).  
Furthermore, since wage policies are pursued nationally by independent social partners the 
only tool left to accommodate divergent economic developments is fiscal policy. Therefore, 
some economists argue that stronger coordination or centralisation of fiscal policies is needed 
to reduce macroeconomic divergences among EMU member states (Bofinger, 2003; Baldwin 
and Wyplosz, 2006, de Grauwe, 2009b, de Grauwe, 2011). From this position, one can infer 
that the coordination failure of national economic policies in the EMU and not over-indebted 
EMU-countries lies at the heart of the EMU crisis. This seems to be supported by the fact that 
average government debt of the EMU only rose sharply from 70% of GDP in 2008 to 88% of 
GDP in 2011 in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This rise is mainly due to bank bailouts 
and economic stimuli packages. In contrast, a slightly declining government debt-to-GDP ratio 
of EMU member states from 68% to 66% could be seen from 2002 to 2007. 
                                                 
1 Note that the view of the author does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Federal Finance 
Administration and the Federal Finance Department. 
2 Some Keynesian authors argue that fully downward flexibility of wages is not desirable because it bears the 
risk of prolonging and deepening a recession by exerting deflationary pressure (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993).   
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One reason that so far exogenous shocks have not been absorbed sufficiently has been the 
rather pro-cyclical stance of national fiscal policies under the previous SGP (Dullien and 
Schwarzer, 2009). This confirms a critique of SGP which hints to the fact that on the one hand 
the 3%-deficit-limit can be too restrictive in a recession. On the other hand, the SGP offers no 
incentives for anti-cyclical fiscal policies during an upturn (e.g. Colombier, 2006). Therefore, 
Dullien and Schwarzer (2009) propose the implementation of automatic fiscal stabilisers at the 
European level.  
Research findings show that in contrast to the SGP, debt brakes would allow for a better 
working of automatic stabilisers, in particular, in an economic upswing (Colombier, 2006; 
Hishow, 2011). Thus, debt brakes might render better coordination of policies and more 
political unification unnecessary. Therefore, this present paper raises the question whether the 
implementation of national debt brakes is an effective mean to fight off divergent economic 
developments in the EMU. For this, an empirical analysis is carried out that focuses on the 
impact of national fiscal policies on current-account balances in the EMU. Based on these 
estimations it is simulated how the implementation of the debt brake would have affected the 
development of the current account balances of a current-account deficit country, i.e. Spain, 
and -surplus country, i.e. Germany, since the launch of the Euro. Results of this analysis suggest 
that the debt brake could contribute to reduce external deficits, but only under certain 
conditions. Therefore, European policy makers have to go beyond fiscal compacts to fix 
structural drawback of the EMU, i.e. the coordination failure, by, e.g., delegating more fiscal 
responsibilities to the EU level. 
This paper is organised as follows. In the following section, the German debt brake is 
delineated, which has served as a role model for the balanced-budget rule of the fiscal compact. 
Section 3 analyses the impact of fiscal policy under a debt brake on the balances of payment 
from a theoretical perspective. Section 4 provides empirical results about the impact of 
government action on external balances for the case of German. Section 5 presents simulations 
how an introduction of a German-style debt brake would have affected current-account balances 
in Germany and Spain. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in the closing part of this paper. 
2 The debt brake and external imbalances from a theoretical perspective 
Debt brakes are framed against the background of the (new) neo-classical synthesis (see 
Colombier, 2006, 529). The debt brake aims at stabilising nominal debt over the business cycle, 
but budget movements due to cyclical fluctuations should be allowed. According to neo-
classical theory, fiscal policy can smooth the business cycle but is not able to enhance the long-
run production possibilities of an economy. On the contrary, a too high debt-level may cause 
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uncertainty among consumers and investors, which in turn causes interest rates to rise and as a 
result, crowd out private investment. Therefore, the structural government budget should be 
balanced over the business cycle under a debt brake. However, since the advent of new growth 
theory several studies show that certain kind of government spending such as educational or 
infrastructure expenditure can be growth-promoting (e.g. Colombier, 2009). To consider this 
possibility, the German debt break allows for a structural deficit of 0.35% of GDP at the federal 
level.3 In contrast, the states (the Länder) are not allowed to run a structural deficit.4 The overall 
limit of a structural budget deficit is in the spirit of the SGP, which foresees a close-to-balance 
budget over the business cycle. According to the SGP, the structural budget deficit must not 
exceed 0.5% of GDP. The German debt brake is enshrined in the German constitution (see Art. 
109(1) and 115 Grundgesetz). 
Moreover, according to conventional wisdom discretionary fiscal policy suffers from the 
following shortcomings. First, due to the democratic decision process usually fiscal measure 
are implemented too late and may not be efficiently composed due to strong lobby groups. 
Second, incentives given to policy-makers or civil servants to, for instance, enlarge their 
influence and power lead to a deficit bias of the government sector. Nonetheless, to smooth the 
business cycle automatic stabilisers such as the unemployment insurance should be able to 
work. Since the beginning of 2011, the German debt brake has come into force at the federal 
level (see also fn. 4). At the federal level, apart from a structural component the debt brake 
contains a cyclical component, which allows the automatic stabilisers to work. To give policy-
makers limited flexibility the federal government can exempt from the rule under exceptional 
economic conditions such as a financial crisis or natural catastrophes. Along the lines of the 
SGP, financial transactions such as revenues for privatisation of public assets or loans to the 
unemployment insurance are excluded from the calculation of the deficit ceiling. A crucial part 
of the German debt brake is the control account. As the debt brake relies heavily on forecasts 
of government revenues deviations from the deficit ceiling e.g. due to forecast errors enter the 
control account. Only deviations, which are not due to the business cycle, are taken into 
account. Notable exceptions are revisions of GDP-forecasts, which generally do not enter the 
control account. This is done in order to make the debt brake more binding and to take account 
                                                 
3  In particular, the German Federal Ministry of Finance was very sceptical about a golden rule for public 
investment, which limits the structural deficit to the level of public investment (see Baumann et al., 2008, 40-41). 
The Ministry emphasises that the former German golden rule was rather ineffective and that a suitable definition 
of public investments is elusive.  
4 Note that the German states should have their own debt brakes implemented by 2020. Apart from the binding 
constraint of a balanced structural budget the states have some leeway to formulate their debt-brake rules. In 
particular, the states can choose if their rule permits the budget to fluctuate with the business cycle. For a detailed 
overview see Deutsche Bundesbank (2011). 
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of unforeseeable financial needs. In particular, government practices that damage the rule, such 
as systematic error-prone budgeting should be avoided. At certain thresholds, the government 
is obliged to take action in order to reduce the deficit.5  
The government budget identity in terms of GDP of a EMU country j is as follows: 
 gy,j + rj bj ≡ try,j + Δbj (1) 
 with: gy,j := ratio of public expenditure to GDP 
  try,j:= ratio of public revenues to GDP 
  bj:= ratio of outstanding stock of government debt to GDP 
  Δbj:= new bonds issued in the current period in terms of GDP 
As EMU member states cannot fund their expenditure by printing new high-powered money, 
public expenditure can only be financed by tax revenues or issuing bonds. Under the debt brake 
a limit is placed on the issuing of new bonds. This deficit ceiling can be written as follows:6 
 Δbc,j ≤ σj - εj (yj-yj*)/yj*≤ 0.03*yj (2) 
 with: yj
*:= potential GDP of EMU member country j 
  (yj-yj
*)/yj
*:= output gap of EMU member country j 
  εj:= budget sensitivity with respect to a 1%-change of the output gap 
  σj:= structural deficit limit, Germany 0.35% of GDP (Spain 0.4% of GDP)
7 
The deficit ceiling (Δbc,j) is calculated as the sum of a cyclical component (second term on the 
rhs of equation (2)) and a structural component (first term on the rhs of equation (2)) of the 
government budget. To calculate the cyclical component of the government budget the so-
called budget sensitivity (εj) with respect to changes of the output gap is applied. The budget 
sensitivity comprises the short-term income elasticities of those revenue and expenditure items, 
which fluctuate with the business cycle. In the German debt-brake framework, these are income 
and consumption taxes as well as social contributions and expenditure for labour-market 
measures. Equation (2) shows that the government is allowed to exceed the structural deficit 
limit if the economy is in a recession (negative output gap) and vice versa (positive output gap). 
In addition, the headline deficit should meet the deficit criterion of the SGP, which limits the 
headline deficit to three percent of GDP. Over the cycle, the cyclical-adjusted budget must not 
exceed the structural deficit limit (σj) of the debt brake: 
                                                 
5 If the deficit of the control account reaches 1.5% of GDP the government must reduce the deficit. Above 1.0% 
of GDP the government must reduce the deficit if the output gap is not negative, i.e. the economy is not in a 
downturn. 
6 In the case of the German debt brake an output gap, which is calculated by the European Commission (COM), is 
applied. For this calculation the COM uses a production-function method (Denis et al., 2006). 
7 A cap of 0.4% of GDP is intended to be set for the structural budget balance in Spain from 2020 (Economist, 
September 3rd 2011). 
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 gy,j
* + rj bj – try,j
* ≤ σj (3) 
 with: gy,j
*:= cyclcical-adjusted public expenditure excluding financial transactions 
   such as loans to the unemployment insurance. 
  try,j
*:= cyclical-adjusted public revenues excluding financial transactions such as 
   revenues from privatisation of public assets. 
 
3 Impact of debt brakes on external balances 
Assuming a New-Keynesian model of an open economy it can be shown that a debt brake 
can be conducive to a coherent development in a currency union such as the EMU under certain 
conditions (Carlin and Soskice, 2006). To provide an intuition about the impact of the debt 
brake on external balances a sketch of such a model is given below.8  
In such a model an independent central bank, e.g. the ECB, pursues the single goal of union-
wide price stability. In order to reach price stability the ECB sets a union-wide nominal interest 
rate (i) based on a Taylor rule. Market actors make adaptive expectations on union-wide 
inflation rate (π) and the inflation rate of a EMU member country j (πj).
9 For simplicity it is 
further assumed that the inflation rate expected for the next period corresponds to the current 
inflation rate. In the model a stabilising real interest rate (rs) is presupposed at which the 
domestic labour and goods markets of each EMU member are in an equilibrium. In this case, 
an overall equilibrium in the currency union is reached. Although a union-wide equilibrium 
means that current-account balances are stabilised, a settlement of these balances is only 
achieve by chance.10 The above assumptions lead to the following equivalent equations for the 
union- wide nominal (i) and real interest rate (r): 
 i = rs + π + (π - πT) (4a) 
 r = rs + (π - πT) (4b) 
If the inflation rates of EMU member states correspond to the union-wide inflation rate (π) 
and the ECB manages to stabilise the union-wide inflation rate at its inflation target (πT), i.e. at 
maximum 2%, the real interest rate (r) would be equal to the stabilising interest rate (rs). 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed account see Colombier (2013). 
9 Usually rational expectations are assumed. But given the fact that even professional forecasters cannot agree on 
a common economic model, which is prerequisite for the proper working of rational expectations, and the economy 
is an evolutionary system, adaptive expectation would appear to be more realistic. This is supported by insights 
from behavioural economics. These results show that the more complex it gets to make a decision the more likely 
it is that individuals resort to simple decision-rules like rules of thumps. Thus, more often than not individuals tend 
to extrapolate from the past to foresee future developments (see Kahnemann, 2003, 1460).  
10 Note that no distinction between the trade and current-account balance is made in the model. 
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However, different individual inflation rates (πj) lead to spreads between real interest rates (rj) 
of EMU member countries.11  
 rj = i - πj  (5a) 
If the nominal interest rate, i, in equation (5a) is substituted with the right-hand side of 
equation (4a), one arrives at the following formula: 
 rj = r
s + (π - πT) + (π – πj) (5b) 
Equation (5b) shows that two conditions must be met to reach an overall equilibrium in the 
EMU, i.e. a domestic (medium-term-) market equilibrium in each EMU-country. First, the 
union-wide inflation rate (π) should correspond to the inflation target of the ECB (π= πT). But 
to reach a domestic market equilibrium in each EMU member country all individual inflation 
rates (πj) should be tantamount to the union-wide inflation rate (π) (π = πj). However, as 
conditions of labour and product markets can differ substantially between EMU member states 
nothing guarantees that the second condition is met. This demonstrates that even if the ECB 
manages to keep the union-wide inflation rate at the target level the ECB cannot steer individual 
inflation rates. Consequently, a common monetary policy cannot even stabilise, let alone 
reduce, current-account balances. As labour markets in the EMU do not provide sufficient 
flexibility and mobility to compensate for possibly asymmetric shocks on EMU member 
countries the only instrument left to accommodate these shocks is fiscal policy (see section 1).12 
Fiscal policy of member countries can contribute to a convergent economic development by 
stabilising the economy. This can enhance the chances that individual inflation rates and the 
union-wide inflation rate correspond.  
To make the analysis simple, it is assumed that the ECB manages to keep the union-wide 
inflation rate close to its target level, i.e. π ≈ πT, so that the second term on the right-hand side 
of equation (5b) is approximately zero. Given that the cyclically adjusted government budget 
is balanced, a debt-brake allows, in principle, automatic stabilisers to work without interference 
of discretionary fiscal policy.13  This can help to absorb asymmetric shocks under certain 
conditions. For example, if the economy of a current-account deficit country such as Spain is 
booming, automatic stabilisers act counter-cyclically and thus keep the Spanish inflation rate 
closer to the union-wide inflation rate. All things being equal, the latter would counteract 
                                                 
11 Note that for simplification risk premiums are not taken into account. 
12 As the experiences of the crisis-ridden countries such as Spain, Portugal or Ireland show, it may also not 
desirable to have a fully flexible labour market as an internal devaluation through cutting wages are quite costly 
in terms of unemployment. Moreover, as already emphasised in fn. 2 downward flexibility of wages runs the risk 
of plunging an economy into a deflation.  
13 Nevertheless, to what extent automatic stabilisers can actually act under a debt brake depends on the method 
chosen to divide GDP into a cyclical and structural component and is open to debate (see e.g. Colombier, 2006, 
526-528).  
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diverging economic developments in the EMU as the spread of the Spanish real interest rate 
and the union-wide real interest rate would be reduced (see equation (5b)). As a result, the loss 
of competitiveness would be mitigated and the corresponding current-account deficit lower than 
without the working of automatic stabilisers. Now assume, that Spain as a current-account 
deficit country moves into a recession. This means c.p. having lower inflation in this country 
than in the currency union, which causes an increase in Spanish competitiveness through 
internal devaluation. Moreover, the real interest rate for Spain would be higher than the 
stabilising real interest rate (see equation (5b)). This brings about a convergent development in 
the EMU because the current-account deficit of Span is reduced. But in this case the 
convergence is slowed down by automatic stabilisers because the stabilisers counteract the 
disinflationary tendency and the widening interest-rate spread. For a current-account surplus 
country the situation is reversed. While automatic stabilisers slow down the reduction of the 
external surplus in an upturn, they decelerate the widening of the external surplus in a downturn. 
To sum up, according to theory a debt-brake coherent fiscal policy can slow down a diverging 
economic development in a currency union by giving automatic stabilisers room to manoeuvre. 
But this is tied to certain conditions. 
Additionally, a debt brake could serve as a preventive measure against rising external 
imbalances in a currency union. Suppose that the economy of a EMU country runs a current-
account deficit and the economy is in a boom phase. Furthermore, the cyclically adjusted 
government budget is balanced. In general, governments have an incentive to increase public 
expenditure to enhance their chances to be re-elected. This is particular true in a booming 
economy. Consequently, the government of a booming EMU country may increase public 
outlays, which would give a boost to aggregate demand. Therefore, both domestic demand and 
the current-account deficit grow. If a government adheres to a debt-brake rule public 
expenditure cannot be increased without raising taxes. However, the latter can be costly for a 
government because it can spoil the chances to stay in office and may produce output losses. 
Therefore, incentives to increase public expenditure in good times would be much reduced 
under a debt brake.  
4 Fiscal policy and net exports – empirical results 
This part presents the findings of the estimations of the short- and long-term impact of 
government activity on external balances for Germany, represented by net exports, from 1970 
to 2008.14 The regressions are based on the New Keynesian model of an open economy outlined 
                                                 
14 For a more detailed account of the empirical approach see Annex. 
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in section 3 (Carlin and Soskice, 2006; Colombier, 2013). Deviating from a standard New 
Keynesian model, I assume that productive public expenditure affects external balances through 
the supply-side of a national economy. Empirical studies provide solid evidence for a growth-
enhancing impact of these public-expenditure items (e.g. Nijkamp and Poot, 2004). These 
include public expenditure on education and transport and communication infrastructure. 
Moreover, it is estimated how non-productive primary public expenditure and taxes affect net 
exports. The fiscal variables are expressed as ratios to GDP so that the tax-to-GDP ratio can be 
viewed as a proxy for the average tax rate. The real effective exchange rate of Germany, which 
is based on unit labour costs, the real long-term interest rate of Germany and the GDP 
aggregated over the second to fourth largest economies of the EMU, which are France, Italy 
and Spain, enter the regressions as control variables. The aggregated GDP of France, Italy and 
Spain serves as a proxy for foreign demand for German products. The coefficients of the 
estimations shown in Table 1 to 3 can be interpreted as elasticity of net exports with respect to 
the corresponding independent variable.  
Overall, the estimations show that foreign demand proves beneficial to net exports in the 
long term (see Table 1). The coefficient is rather stable and the elasticity amounts to well-above 
0.5.  
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
The empirical analysis provides rather robust evidence that an increase of the real exchange 
rate, i.e. improved competitiveness, promotes net exports. Although the estimations show 
positive statistically significantly coefficients of the long-run interest rate, which is 
counterintuitive, the size of the coefficients imply a negligible impact on net exports. 
Concerning fiscal variables, the estimations provide robust evidence for a positive relationship 
between productive public expenditure and net exports. No statistically significant relationship 
is obtained for primary public expenditure, which is in line with theory. The evidence relating 
to the tax ratio points to an adverse impact on net exports as is expected. But the evidence is 
weaker than for productive public expenditure. The long-term elasticity of the tax ratio emerges 
as highly statistically significant at a 5% level only in a single regression. At least, in two out 
of five estimations the coefficient of the tax ratio is weakly statistically significant (10%-level).  
*** Insert Table 2 about here*** 
To consider a possible endogeneity bias instrumented regressions are performed. However, 
in a small sample instrumented regressions can be biased themselves. Therefore, one has to be 
cautious by interpreting the results of these regressions. Nonetheless, with the exception of the 
tax ratio, the instrumented regressions would appear to confirm the results of the first 
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regressions (see Table 2). In contrast, the coefficient of the tax ratio shows neither the expected 
sign nor statistical significance. This can be due to the small-sample bias mentioned above. 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
The estimations of the short-term elasticities of fiscal variables provide evidence for a short-
term impact of the tax ratio on net exports (see Table 3). Nonetheless, since growth dynamics 
have been driven by exports over the last decade in Germany, this result may also be due to 
reversed causality. Only in a single regression the short-term elasticity of non-productive 
primary public expenditure is weakly statistically significant and shows a negative sign. Yet, 
the latter is in line with the prediction of the underlying theoretical model (Colombier, 2013).  
Overall, the empirical analysis of the German case suggests that, in particular, productive 
public expenditure can prove beneficial to net exports. The results show that if the government 
raises taxes not only do net exports increase in the short term, but they also shrink in the long 
term. Even so, one should note that the evidence is not so stable in the long term. Although the 
empirical evidence concerning the short-term impact of non-productive primary public 
expenditure is weak, the results imply the possibility that these public expenditure items put a 
drag on net exports as is predicted by macroeconomic theory.  
5 Ex-post simulations of debt-brake-coherent budget balances 
In the following, government deficits ceilings of Germany and Spain that are based on a 
German-type debt brake are calculated for the pre-crisis period from 2002 to 2007. For the 
simulation of debt-brake-coherent deficit ceilings I assume that forecasts of GDP and 
government budgets had not suffered from forecast errors since the launch of the common 
currency in the EMU. In Tables 4a and 4b actual government deficits (Δb) of Germany and 
Spain are compared with the deficit ceilings under the debt brake (Δbc).  
***Insert Tables 4a and 4b about here*** 
Tables 4a and 4b report also the cyclical component of the public deficit under the debt brake 
(-ε*output gap) and the reduction of the deficit (Δbc- Δb) that would have been necessary to 
abide by the debt-brake rule. What is striking is that Germany breached the rule in each year. 
In contrast, the Spanish budget was in line with a debt brake in the period from 2005 to 2007. 
As a result, an implementation of the debt brake in 2002 would have lowered the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in Spain only slightly by 1.6%. In contrast, the impact of the debt brake on Germany’s 
debt ratio would have been substantial. The debt brake would have reduced the German debt 
by about 13% of GDP. Although these are only rough calculations, it clearly shows that current 
economic difficulties of Spain are not caused by government profligacy but by the indebtedness 
of the private sector and banks, which have been spurred by the housing boom in Spain. 
12 
 
Moreover, if one defines fiscal sustainability as abiding by the debt-brake rule Spain 
outperforms Germany in the pre-crisis period. Thus, a debt brake would have not contributed 
much to sustaining public finances in Spain. Therefore, it is all the more important to examine 
if under a debt brake the divergent economic developments would have been reduced.  
*** Insert Table 5a and 5b about here ***  
In order to provide an answer, I run a few simple simulations for the pre-crisis period from 
2002 to 2007. The simulations are based on the results of the empirical analysis for Germany 
(see section 3). It is assumed that the debt brake would have been introduced in 2002. For the 
simulations the median of the statistically significant elasticities is used (see Table 5a). To 
account for stochastic uncertainty of the estimations the lower- and upper-bound elasticities of 
the confidence intervals are also applied to the simulations. Two different types of simulations 
are run. 
First, it is analysed how the need to adjust the structural budget balance under the provisions 
of the debt brake affects external balances (structural adjustment) (see Table 5b). I assume that 
either tax rates or productive public expenditure are adjusted to abide by the debt brake.15 As 
the empirical analysis provides no evidence for a long-term impact of non-productive 
expenditure on external balances, these expenditure items are not taken into account. 
Furthermore, the simulations take into account that a variation of the tax rate may exert a short 
and long-term effect on the economy. The procedure of these simulations is as follows. At first, 
the impact of the structural adjustments on net exports is calculated by applying the 
corresponding elasticities (see Table 5b). Then, the historical change in net exports is corrected 
by the afore-mentioned impact of the structural adjustment. 
Second, the impact of automatic stabilisers on net export is simulated. The automatic 
stabilisers, which are included in the simulations, encompass tax revenues and primary public 
current expenditure.16 In these simulations it is assumed that the structural budget balance of 
the government is in line with the debt brake. Moreover, to isolate the impact of automatic 
stabilisers on net exports I assume that the economy fluctuates around a stationary equilibrium. 
The impact of automatic stabilisers is simulated by using the estimates of the short-term 
                                                 
15 Note that I carry out the simulations under the assumption that an increase of tax rates brings about rising 
revenues in the long run. Thus, a tax increase causes a less than proportional decrease in GDP. How the GDP is 
affected by a tax increase depends on a number of factors such as what type of tax is increased, the initial 
composition of taxes and the initial tax ratio. A detailed account of these tax effects goes beyond the scope of this 
analysis. 
16 Note that primary public current expenditure, i.e. expenditure without investment spending, do not exactly 
correspond to non-productive primary public expenditure, which is used in the empirical part of this chapter (see 
section 4). But due to limited data availability for the Spanish case primary public current expenditure are applied 
to the simulations as a proxy for non-productive primary public expenditure. 
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elasticities of fiscal variables and by taking the sensitivity of these fiscal variables with respect 
to business-cycle fluctuations into account (see Table 5a). 
The simulations show that the introduction of the debt brake in Germany in 2002 would have 
brought about a reduction of German net exports if the German government had increased taxes 
to adjust the structural budget balance (see Table 5b). This finding presupposes that the absolute 
value of the tax-rate elasticity is well-above zero (see Table 5a). The results are inconclusive 
with respect to a cut in productive public expenditure because two opposing effects are at work. 
To be debt-brake coherent the German government had to reduce productive public expenditure 
by 3.5% of GDP in 2002. As a result, German competitiveness and net exports would have been 
lowered (see Table 5b). But in the following years it would have been possible to increase 
productive public expenditure under a debt break so that the first impact would have been 
compensated to some extent. Therefore, net exports are related to productive public expenditure 
in a non-linear way. In contrast, a structural adjustment of the Spanish budget through a tax 
increase would have barely affected net exports. 
The simulations for automatic stabilisers suggest that the counter-cyclical fluctuations of 
primary public current expenditure items does not affect Spanish net exports. In contrast, 
evidence is provided that tax revenues could have considerably contributed to a shrinking of 
the Spanish trade deficit. This is caused by the fact that due to the debt brake Spanish fiscal 
policy had been forced to be more restrictive in the boom phase. In contrast, automatic 
stabilisers would have had almost no impact on the German trade balance. This finding comes 
as no surprise because Germany experienced a complete business cycle between 2002 and 2007. 
In addition, one should bear in mind that these simulations are carried out under the assumption 
of a stationary economy. Nevertheless, the simulations also suggests that a sufficiently high 
sensitivity of net exports with respect to taxes would have allowed for small adverse effects. 
Overall, the results concerning tax revenues meet expectations from theory (see section 3). 
Thus, the working of this automatic stabiliser appears to prove beneficial in terms of reducing 
external imbalances under certain conditions. Contrary to tax revenues primary public current 
expenditure do not seem to affect net exports considerably. Moreover, the structural 
adjustments needed under a debt brake might support a convergent development in a currency 
union as is shown for the German case. However as, in particular, the findings for the Spanish 
case demonstrate, this result also seems to be sensitive to the idiosyncratic nature of the 
economic situation.  
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6 Conclusion 
This present paper shows that a debt-brake can contribute to a convergent economic 
development in a currency union, but only under special conditions. In particular, a debt-brake 
considerably reduces the incentives for a pro-cyclical fiscal policy in an upswing. 
Consequently, automatic stabilisers can work properly and, on top of this, decelerate a growing 
current-account deficit in a booming economy, such as was the case in Spain before the crisis. 
In addition, the debt brake limits the freedom of policy-maker to implement pro-cyclical fiscal-
policy measures. A slowing down of the economy in Spain might have also slowed down the 
accumulation of private debt, which may have put Spain in a better position to come to terms 
with the crisis. This is a clearly defined case, under which the debt brake can prove beneficial 
to reduce divergent economic developments in a currency union. But overall, the present 
simulations for Germany and Spain show that the way the debt brake affects external balances 
depends on various factors, in particular, the position in the business cycle, the sign of the 
current-account balance and the instruments chosen by governments to adjust the structural 
budget balance. Thus, from this present analysis one can infer that the impact of national debt 
brakes on current-account balances is limited.  
Additionally, the simulation exercise carried out in this chapter shows that Spanish public 
finances were sustainable in the pre-crisis years, whereas Germany’s public finances were not. 
This finding clearly supports the view held by some economists such as De Grauwe (2011) that 
it is the coordination failure in the EMU and not government profligacy, which is key to 
resolving the current economic crisis of the EMU.  
From the results of this present analysis two crucial policy conclusions can be drawn. First, 
the fiscal compact that contains the debt brake as a key component will not suffice to align 
EMU economies and even cannot prevent further divergent developments. Second, to tackle 
the structural problems of the EMU, European governments have to resort to measures that can 
effectively contain divergent developments among EMU economies such as union-wide 
automatic stabilisers. Therefore, a partly delegation of fiscal responsibilities to the EU level 
seems to be a sine qua non for restoring a balanced economic development in the EMU. 
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Annex 
Empirical approach and data 
Macroeconomic and fiscal data are taken from the annual macroeconomic (AMECO) 
database of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs. Decomposed fiscal data stem from the IMF Government Finance Statistics.  
A time-series approach is applied in order to avoid certain problems surrounding a panel-
data approach, in particular 'parameter heterogeneity' (e.g. Temple, 2000), and to take account 
of the idiosyncratic nature of economic developments in EMU member states. 17  The 
estimations are carried out for the largest economy of the EMU, i.e. Germany. The data set for 
Germany ranges from 1970 to 2008. In order to ensure that the regressions are not spurious it 
has to be tested whether the chosen variables are stationary. For this I apply robust unit-root 
tests.18 The bounds-testing procedure by Pesaran et al. (2001), which allows for I(0)- and I(1)-
regressors, is applied to test for cointegation. Furthermore, the robust MM-estimator proposed 
by Yohai et al. (1991) is applied to the regressions in levels.19  
In order to test whether government activity exerts an influence on current-account balance 
I use an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. Once a cointegrating relationship has 
been established, the order of lags of the ARDL model is selected by applying an appropriate 
lag-selection criterion, i.e. the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). In addition, I 
follow Pesaran and Shin (1999) who propose using a maximum of two lags with annual data. 
This leads to the following ARDL model: 
abt(t) = β0 + β1 abt(t-1) + β2,1 gprod(t) + β2,2 gprod(t-1) + β3,1ty(t) + β3,2ty(t-1) + β4 gprim(t)  
 +β5,1 yea3(t) +β5,2 yea3(t-1) + β6 r(t) + β7 θpure(t) + v(t) (A1) 
 with: β0:= intercept; βi>0:= regression coefficient; v≔ error term. 
  abt≔ ratio of exports to imports 
  gprod≔ productive public expenditure, including education and  
  transport and communication infrastructure; 
  gprim:= non-productive primary public expenditure (i.e. it excludes gprod); 
  ty≔ total tax revenues; 
  yea3 ≔ aggregated GDP of France, Italy and Spain; 
  r≔ real long-term interest rate of Germany (deflated by consumer price index) 
  θpure:= real exchange rate purified by other regressors of equation (A1). 
                                                 
17 For a more detailed account of the empirical approach see Colombier (2013). 
18 The results of the unit-root tests can be obtained upon request from the author.  
19 For the benefits of the high-breakdown MM-estimator see Colombier(2009, section II). 
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In order to be able to interpret the regression coefficients as elasticities, I use the ratio of 
exports to imports as the dependent variable, i.e. the adjusted balance of trade (abt).20 Fiscal 
variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Note that to avoid collinearity between fiscal 
variables, estimations are either run with tax revenues (ty) or public expenditure (see Colombier, 
2009, 902). As productive public expenditure is a share of total public expenditure, productive 
public expenditure are subtracted from total public expenditure. Moreover, interest payments 
of the government are also subtracted so that non-productive primary public expenditure (gprim) 
enters the estimated equation. Finally, the error-correction model, which is applied to the 
Bounds-testing procedure, is used to estimate the short-term impact of the explanatory variables 
on net exports (see Table 3). Moreover, one can infer from macroeconomic theory that the real 
exchange rate (θ) depends on the same set of variables as net exports (abt) (Colombier, 2013). 
Thus, the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable. In order to obtain the residual part of 
the real exchange rate, which is not endogenously determined, I run a regression with the real 
exchange rate as dependent variable on the remaining regressors of equation (A1). Thus, the 
real exchange rate is 'purified' from the influence of the other regressors. 
  
                                                 
20 Note that the latter can be viewed as an equivalent to net exports (Colombier, 2013). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Cointegration test (Bounds test) and long-run model - Germany 
Variable Estimated model 
 lags        lags   
Export-to-
import ratio  
t-1 0.45*** 
(0.11) 
0.61*** 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
0.62*** 
(0.20) 
0.56*** 
(0.18) 
0.71*** 
(0.23) 
t-1 0.45*** 
(0.12) 
0.35*** 
(0.12) 
Real GDP EA3a  t, t-1 0.45*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.16) 
0.52** 
(0.19) 
0.52** 
(0.19) 
0.65** 
(0.23) 
0.53*** 
(0.16) 
0.55** 
(0.22) 
t 0.40*** 
(0.10) 
0.43*** 
(0.08) 
Productive 
public 
expenditureb  
t, t-1 0.28** 
(0.10) 
0.46** 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.21 
(0.16) 
0.51** 
(0.22) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.47** 
(0.21) 
t 0.28*** 
(0.10) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
Non - 
productive 
primary public 
exp. c 
t -0.04 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
   -0.01 
(0.13) 
 t -0.18 
(0.13) 
 
Tax revenues  t, t-1   -1.17* 
(0.66) 
-1.22* 
(0.67) 
-0.15 
(0.65) 
 0.11 
(0.75) 
t  -0.66** 
(0.30) 
Purified real 
exchange rate  
t 0.30*** 
(0.11) 
  0.51*** 
(0.17) 
 0.15 
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.24) 
t 0.38*** 
(0.10) 
0.43*** 
(0.10) 
Real long-term 
interest rate  
t  0.02 
(0.02) 
  0.02*** 
(0.007) 
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
t   
Adj. R^2 (as %)  64.5 79.4 75.3 75.7 78.5 78.8 54.8  67.1 73.5 
Bounds F-test  10.1*** 5.56** 6.34** 7.11*** 5.98** 5.00** 5.28**  10.1*** 7.11*** 
Box-Ljung test   12.8 12.7 17.0 17.4 13.3 11.1 5.99  13.8 18.3 
Normality test  0.80*** 0.95 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.97 0.95 0.84***  0.82*** 0.84*** 
Ramsey reset 
test 
 0.40 0.72 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.62 1.11  0.70 0.31 
BIC  -76.8 -91.6 -84.9 -85.4 -88.7 -89.0 -66.9  -84.7 -90.7 
Notes: ***:= 1% significance level; **:= 5% significance level; *:= 10% significance level; all variables in 
logarithms; robust MM-estimator applied to regressions (Yohai et al., 1991); t tests: figures in parentheses are 
standard errors; Bounds F-test with OLS (Pesaran et al., 2001): H0: no cointegration, critical values for small 
samples from Narayan (2005); Box-Ljung test: H0: no autocorrelation of residuals, Box-Ljung statistic; Shapiro-
Wilk normality test: H0: Gaussian distribution, W test statistic; Ramsey reset test: H0: no misspecification, F test 
statistic; BIC:= Bayesian information criterion. 
If Box-Ljung tests indicates autocorrelation at at minimum 10%-significance level, HAC standard errors by 
Andrews (1991) are applied. 
aEA3:= France, Italy and Spain; bSum of education and transport expenditure; cTotal primary public expenditure 
minus productive public expenditure. 
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Table 2: Instrumented regressions long-run model - Germany 
Variable Instruments Spearman rank 
correlation (as %) 
Estimated model 
Export-to-import ratio 
(t-1)  
lag (t-2) 73 0.38*** (0.10) 0.35*** (0.11)) 
Real GDP EA3a (t-1) none  0.48*** (0.06) 0.45*** (0.07) 
Productive public 
expenditureb (t) 
lag (t-1) 79 0.35*** (0.09) 0.30*** (0.09) 
Non-productive 
primary public exp. c 
lag (t-1), lag (t-2) 58 -0.06 (0.23)  
Tax revenues (t) lag (t-1) 74  0.29 (0.47) 
Purified real exchange 
rate (t) 
lag (t-1), lag (t-2) 61 0.40** (0.15) 0.36** (0.15) 
Real long-term 
interest rate (t) 
lag (t-1), lag (t-2) 74 0.03** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.008) 
Adj. R^2 (as %)   60.3 61.3 
Sargan test   -15.3 -13.8 
Box-Ljung test    3.50* 3.85* 
Normality test   0.86*** 0.87*** 
Ramsey reset test   0.65 0.96 
BIC   -67.8 -68.4 
Notes: see Notes Table 1; Sargan's test on validity of instruments: Chi-square test statistic, H0: valid 
instruments. 
aEA3:= France, Italy and Spain; bSum of education and transport expenditure; cTotal primary public expenditure 
minus productive public expenditure. 
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Table 3: Short-term impact - Germany 
Variable   Short-term part 
First differences lags     
Export-to-import ratio t-1 -0.22 (0.18) -0.001 (0.24) 0.14 (0.22) 0.12 (0.22) 
Real GDP EA3a  t-1 -0.84 (0.55) -0.51 (0.71) -0.71 (0.60) -0.79 (0.65) 
Productive public 
expenditureb  
t-1 -0.04 (0.10) -0.02 (0.16) -0.005 (0.11) -0.03 (0.13) 
Non-prod. primary 
public expenditurec 
t-1 -0.34* (0.19) 0.20 (0.24)   
Tax revenues    1.19* (0.61) 1.25** (0.57) 
Purified real exchange 
rate 
t-1 0.75*** 
(0.20) 
 0.34 (0.24)  
Real long-term interest 
rate  
t-1  -0.004 (0.01)  0.0 (0.01) 
Error correction term  t-1 -0.58** 
(1.54) 
-0.61** 
(0.24) 
-0.81** 
(0.30) 
-0.55** 
(0.24) 
Adj. R^2 (as %)  66.8 46.0 66.2 57.1 
Box-Ljung test   19.5 18.3 22.7* 12.9 
Normality test  0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Ramsey reset test  0.64 0.47 3.01 0.56 
BIC  -82.8 -72.0 -82.4 -78.2 
Notes: see Notes Table 1; note that OLS-estimator is applied to Bounds-test approach. 
aEA3:= France, Italy and Spain; bSum of education and transport expenditure; cTotal primary public expenditure 
minus productive public expenditure. 
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Table 4a: Ex-post deficit ceilings under the debt brake – Germany (as % of GDP)a,b,c 
Year ∆b  ∆bc  -ε*output gap ∆bc-∆b 
 
 
σ =0.35 ε=0.51  
 
2002 3.85 0.35 0.00 -3.50 
2003 4.15 1.20 0.85 -2.95 
2004 3.76 1.24 0.89 -2.52 
2005 3.32 1.48 1.13 -1.85 
2006 1.64 0.28 -0.07 -1.36 
2007 -0.24 -0.71 -1.06 -0.47 
a Red figures indicate breach of debt brake. 
b ∆b >0:= deficit and vice versa. 
c For budget sensitivity see Girouard and André (2005). 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Ex-post deficit ceilings under the debt brake – Spain (as % of GDP)a,b,c 
Year ∆b a ∆bc  -ε*output gap ∆bc-∆b 
 
 
σ =0.4 ε=0.44 c 
 
2002 0.21 -1.18 -1.58 -1.40 
2003 0.35 -0.69 -1.09 -1.04 
2004 0.11 -0.61 -1.01 -0.72 
2005 -1.27 -0.84 -1.24 0.43 
2006 -2.37 -1.55 -1.95 0.82 
2007 -1.92 -1.66 -2.06 0.26 
a Red figures indicate breach of debt brake. 
b ∆b >0:= deficit and vice versa. 
c For budget sensitivity see Girouard and André (2005). 
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Table 5a: Elasticities of net exports and fiscal variables applied to simulations  
Dependent variablea’b Variable Elasticity   
  Long-term Short-term Girouard/ André (2005) 
  Min Med Max Min Med Max Germany Spain 
Net exports Tax ratio -0.03 -1.21 -2.39 0.12 1.29 2.47   
Net exports 
Productive public 
expenditure 
0.03 0.50 0.97      
Net exports 
Non- prod. primary 
public expenditure 
   -0.01 -0.34 -0.67   
Tax revenues          
  Personal taxd Output gap       1.61 1.92 
  Indirect tax Output gap       1.00 1.00 
Primary public 
current expenditure 
Unemployment gapc       -0.18 -0.15 
Notes: Elasticity: min:= lower-bound value of the confidence interval of a statistically significant coefficient (see 
Table 1); max:= upper-bound value of the confidence interval; med:= median of statistically significant 
coefficients (see Table 1). 
a Elasticity of net exports are taken from the estimations for Germany.  
b For elasticity of tax revenues and current primary public expenditure see Girouard and André (2005, 22). 
c Gap between the structural unemployment rate and the unemployment rate (see Girouard and André, 2005, 7). 
d For simplification the elasticity of corporate taxes is not taken into account. As the elasticity of the corporate 
tax with respect to the output gap is lower than for a personal tax (Germany: 1.53; Spain 1.15), the results for the 
personal tax shown in Table 5b may be slightly overstated.  
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Table 5b: Simulating the impact of fiscal policy under a debt-brake rule on net exports for the 
period 2002-2007 (as % of GDP) 
Variable Net exports 2007  Net exports simulated 2007 
  Structural adjustment Automatic stabiliser 
  Min Med Max Min Med Max 
Germany 7%       
Tax ratio  7% 4% 1% 7% 7% 6% 
Prod. publ. exp.  8% 12% 2%    
Primary publ. current exp.     7% 7% 7% 
Spaina -7%       
Tax ratio  -7% -7% -7% -5% -2% 1% 
Primary publ. current exp.     -7% -7% -7% 
Notes: see Notes Table 5a. 
a Data for productive public expenditure have not been available. 
 
 
 
